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Abstract—This paper describes work in progress towards an
automated formal and rigorous analysis of the Ad hoc On-
Demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing protocol, a popular
protocol used in ad hoc wireless networks.
We give a brief overview of a model of AODV implemented in
the UPPAAL model checker, and describe experiments carried
out to explore AODV’s behaviour in two network topologies.
We were able to locate automatically and confirm some known
problematic and undesirable behaviours. We believe this use of
model checking as a diagnostic tool complements other formal
methods based protocol modelling and verification techniques,
such as process algebras. Model checking is in particular useful
for the discovery of protocol limitations and in the development
of improved variations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Route finding and maintenance are critical for the per-
formance of networked systems, particularly when mobility
can lead to highly dynamic and unpredictable environments;
such operating contexts are typical in wireless mesh networks
(WMNs). Hence correctness and good performance of routing
algorithms is highly needed for routing algorithms. The Ad
hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing protocol [9]
is a widely used and adapted routing protocol designed for
WMNs and mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). It is one of
the four protocols defined in an RFC (Request for Comments)
document by the IETF MANET working group. AODV also
forms the basis of new WMN routing protocols, including the
upcoming IEEE 802.11s wireless mesh network standard [5].
It has been observed to perform suboptimally [7], which has
provided the impetus to seek variations and improvements of
AODV, to achieve better overall performance and reliability.
Developing new routing protocols for WMNs and MANETs,
as well as modifications of existing protocols, is a very
challenging task.
Usually, routing protocols are optimised to achieve key
objectives such as providing self-organising capability, over-
all reliability and performance in typical network scenarios.
Additionally, it is important to guarantee protocol properties
such as loop freedom, for non-typical, unanticipated scenarios.
This is particularly relevant for highly dynamic MANETs and
WMNs.
The traditional approaches for the analysis of MANET
and WMN routing protocols are simulation and test-bed
experiments. While these are important and valid methods
for protocol evaluation, there are limitations: experimental
evaluation is resource intensive, time-consuming, and even
during a very long time of evaluation, only a finite set of
network scenarios can be considered, and no general guarantee
can be given about protocol behaviour for a wide range
of unpredictable deployment scenarios. The challenges of
extensive experimental evaluation are illustrated by recent
discoveries of limitations of protocols that have been under
intense scrutiny over many years. A recent example is [7].
We believe that formal methods can help in this regard; they
complement simulation and test-bed experiments as methods
for protocol evaluation and verification, and provide stronger
and more general assurances about protocol properties and
behaviour.
In this paper we describe work in progress towards the
use of model checking for exploring the behaviour WMN
routing protocols. Model checking is a powerful method,
which can be used to validate key correctness properties in
finite representations of a formal system model. In the case that
a property is found not to hold, the model checker produces
evidence for the fault in the form of a “counter-example”
summarising the circumstances leading to it. Such diagnostic
information provides important insights into the cause and
correction of these failures.
In [4], we formalised the AODV routing protocol in the
process algebra AWN. In developing the formal specification,
we discovered a number of ambiguities in the IETF RFC
[9]. Our process algebraic formalisation captures these by
several interpretations, each with slightly different AWN code.
Additionally, we found problems with AODV which could
lead to undesirable behaviour. In this paper we employ an
interpretation that captures the main intention and the core
functionality of AODV, as defined in [9]. We use the UP-
PAAL model checker to obtain an executable version of this
formalisation. An executable formal model is an important tool
to confirm and discover the presence of and circumstances
contributing to bad behaviour; it provides insight into network
characteristics, e.g. topology forms, which give rise to it.
Deriving an executable model from an existing formal
specification is among the main advantages of our approach.
The AWN-specification of AODV is particularly readable,
since it closely follows well-known programming constructs.
It therefore lends itself well for comparison with the original
specification of the protocol in English. Based on such a com-
parison we believe that the AWN-model provides a complete
and accurate formal specification of the core functionality of
AODV. By deriving the UPPAAL model from AWN model,
this level of trust is transferred to the UPPAAL model, which
therefore is more reliably a correct model of AODV.
The combined use of AWN and model checking supports
formal proofs of key correctness properties such as loop
freedom on the one side, and formal reasoning with automatic
testing of a large number topologies and property for a given
specification on the other. Used together, this can provide a
powerful tool for the development and rigorous evaluation of
new protocols and variations, and improvements of existing
ones.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. We
give a brief overview of AODV in Section II. In Section
III-B, we describe the UPPAAL model of AODV, which is
based on a process algebraic model (Section III-A). Some of
our experimental results are presented in Section IV, and, in
Section V, we compare our work to other automated analyses.
Finally, we summarise our work and propose future directions
in Section VI.
II. AODV OVERVIEW
AODV is a reactive routing protocol, where the route
between the source and a destination node is established on an
on-demand basis. A route discovery process is initiated when
a source node s has data to send to a destination node d, but
has no valid corresponding routing table entry. In this case,
node s broadcasts a route request (RREQ) message in the
network. The RREQ message is re-broadcast and forwarded
by other intermediate nodes in the network, until it reaches
the destination node d (or an intermediate node that has a
valid route to node d). Every node that receives the RREQ
message will create a routing table entry to establish a reverse
route back to node s. In response to the RREQ message, the
destination node d (or an intermediate node that has a valid
route to node d) unicasts a route reply (RREP) message back
along the previously established reverse route. At the end of
this route discovery process, an end-to-end route between the
source node s and destination node d is established. Usually,
all nodes on this route have a routing table entry to both the
source node s and destination node d. In the event a connection
in this end-to-end route were to break down (due to mobility
or interference), the node that detects the breakdown sends
a route error (RERR) message back to the source node s.
The RERR message will cause the set of affected nodes
to invalidate their routing table entries that use the broken
connection.
III. MODELLING AODV
Our goal is to develop a formal model for specifying WMN
routing protocols in a clear, readable and unambiguous way.
This will allow us to analyse specifications in a systematic
manner, and to compare variations of particular protocols.
A. Process Algebraic Model of AODV
The process algebra AWN [4] has been developed specifi-
cally for modelling WMN routing protocols. It is designed in
a way to be easily readable and treats three necessary features
of WMNs routing protocols: data structures, local broadcast,
and prioritised or conditional unicast. Data structures are used
to model routing tables, data packets, etc.; local broadcast
models message sending to all directly connected nodes; and
the conditional unicast operator models the message sending
to one particular node and chooses a continuation process
dependent on whether the message is successfully delivered.
In AWN, broadcast messages are “guaranteed”, i.e. received
by any neighbour that is directly connected. The abstraction
to a guaranteed broadcast enables us to interpret a failure of
message delivery (under assumptions on the network topology)
as an imperfection in the protocol, rather than as a result of
a chosen formalism not allowing guaranteed delivery. Section
IV-A, for example, describes a simple network topology and a
scenario for which AODV fails to discover a route. Whenever
failure can occur even if broadcast is guaranteed, this means
that the failure is a shortcoming of the protocol itself, and
cannot be excused by unreliable communication.
Conditional unicast models an abstraction of an acknow-
ledgment-of-receipt mechanism that is typical for unicast
communication but absent in broadcast communication, as
implemented by the link layer of relevant wireless standards
such as IEEE 802.11. The process algebra model captures
the bifurcation depending on the success of the unicast, while
abstracting from all implementation processes of the link layer.
We have used AWN to model AODV according to the IETF
RFC3561 [9]. The model captures all core functionalities as
well as the interface to higher protocol layers via the injection
and delivery of application layer data, and the forwarding of
data packets at intermediate nodes. Although the latter is not
part of the AODV protocol specification, it is necessary for a
practical model of any reactive routing protocol where protocol
activity is triggered via the sending and forwarding of data
packets. In addition, our model contains no ambiguities and no
contradictions as they usually occur in specifications written
in natural languages such as in the RFC3561 (see e.g. [4]).
The model of AODV contains a main process, called
AODV, for every node of the network, which handles mes-
sages received and calls the appropriate process PKT, RREQ,
RREP or RERR to handle them. The process also handles the
forwarding of any queued data packets if a valid route to
their destination is known. The other processes, like RREQ,
handle one particular message type each. The network as a
whole is modelled as a parallel composition of these processes.
Special primitives allow us to express whether two nodes are
connected. Full details of the process algebra description on
which our UPPAAL model is based can be found in [4].
B. Modelling AODV in UPPAAL
The process algebraic AWN model of AODV has been
used to prove essential properties, such as loop freedom for
a common interpretation of [9]. These proofs are valid for
all contexts—independent of a particular topology. However,
during modelling, we discovered a number of possible prob-
lems and unexpected behaviours of AODV. Some required
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properties for AODV do not hold, even if guaranteed broadcast
is assumed. For example we discovered that there is no
guarantee that routes will be established. In this paper, we
use model checking to confirm these problems and to set
up an environment to systematically explore and investigate
these and other properties. For that reason the UPPAAL model
follows faithfully the AWN specification of AODV [4].
UPPAAL [1], [6] is well established and used in par-
ticular for protocol verification. The core of the UPPAAL
language consists of networks of timed automata. UPPAAL
provides two synchronisation mechanisms: binary synchroni-
sation channels, which let one automaton synchronise with
exactly one other automaton that has an enabled transition
with a matching label; and broadcast channels, which let one
automaton synchronise with all other automata that have an
enabled transition with a matching label.
Broadcast channels are used to model broadcast commu-
nication of wireless networks where a message is received
by any directly connected node. Every node has a broadcast
channel, and every node in range may synchronise on this
channel. Connections between nodes are determined by a
“connectivity” graph, which in UPPAAL is specified by a
Boolean-valued function. Every directly connected node will
receive the broadcast message and add it to its message buffer.
Broadcast channels are used to model the propagation of
RREQ and RERR messages.
We similarly use UPPAAL’s binary (handshake) synchro-
nisation to model unicast messages. The model includes one
channel for each pair of nodes, and they are only enabled
if they are directly connected. If two nodes are directly
connected, nodes are able to receive any incoming message,
and add them to their message buffer. Binary synchronisation
channels are used to model the unicast of RREP messages and
data packets.
Our UPPAAL model is a direct translation from the model
in process algebra to networks of timed automata. Each node
of the network now becomes an automaton1 with only one
control location (state). This location models the main AODV
process. It has local data structures to model the routing table,
a buffer for incoming messages to await processing, and a
queue for data packets, ready to be forwarded to their respec-
tive destinations once routes are found for them. Transitions
model the handling of the different types of messages, and
thus model the sub-processes PKT, RREQ, RREP, or RERR.
The network as a whole is modelled as a parallel composition
of these automata.
Since many problems in AODV arise only under particular
circumstances or scenarios, we also include the possibility of
a dynamic topology by allowing connections to be created or
deleted. This provides us with the opportunity to explore the
more complex behaviours of AODV.
In addition to the timed automata to model individual nodes
in the network, we add another process tester, which injects
1So far we do not use time and use only finite automata; adding time will
be part of future work.
new packets, and manages the connectivity of nodes (create or
delete connections). This additional timed automaton models
the environment: it defines a specific sequence of events and
changes to the topology of the network. Using this automaton,
we can explore and analyse particular scenarios. We give
examples of testers below, as well as an illustration of the
message sequence charts that are computed by UPPAAL to
illustrate violations of a specified property.
With this basic infrastructure, our model consists of one
timed automaton per node, plus one node to initiate behaviour.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section we report on two experiments that confirm
unexpected and problematic behaviours in the specification of
AODV.2 These problems were discovered during the creation
of the formal specification in AWN, and we confirm that these
problems are also present in the RFC. These experiments can
be considered as validating the UPPAAL model; in future
work we will use the model checking primarily as a way to
explore the types of problems that can arise and under what
circumstances.
A. AODV does not always establish routes
If a node receives a packet from the application layer for
an unknown destination, it initiates a route discovery process.
It will queue the received packet, and broadcast a RREQ
message. Nodes that receive a RREQ message will propagate
the message unless either the node is the destination, or the
node has a valid, and fresh enough routing table entry for the
destination. In these cases the node will respond with a RREP
message.
In AODV’s route discovery process, a RREP message is
unicast back along a route (usually, established by the RREQ
message) towards the originator of the RREQ message. Every
intermediate node on the selected route will process the RREP
message and, in most cases, forward it towards the originator
node. However, there is a possibility that the RREP message
may be discarded at an intermediate node and result in the
originator node not receiving a reply, and consequently not
establishing a route to the destination.
In this experiment we verify that behaviour by setting up a
three-node linear topology with nodes s, a and d.3 Here s is
connected to a, and a is connected to d. Next we define the
UPPAAL process tester, which sets up the following scenario:
both node a and node s are required to send a data packet
to node d (Fig. 1). Initially all the nodes do not have any
information about the connectivity in their routing tables.
tester
newpkt[a][d]!newpkt[s][d]!
Fig. 1. Automaton tester injecting two new packets.
2The UPPAAL input can be found at http://www.cse.unsw.edu.au/∼ansgar/
wripe/ .
3 This problem has already been raised on the MANET mailing list in Oct
2004 (http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/manet/current/msg05702.html).
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Fig. 2. Message Sequence Chart illustrating failed route discovery. Wide
vertical lines mean that the local state did not change in this transition for
that component.
The property of interest in this scenario is whether node s
is ever able to establish a route to d so that it can deliver its
packet. In UPPAAL we use the temporal logic formula “for all
paths there is eventually a (non-empty) routing table entry at
node s for node d”. Within UPPAAL’s restricted CTL syntax,
this property is expressed as:
A<> s.rt[d].nhop!=0
The CTL (state) formula Aφ is satisfied if all paths starting in
that state satisfy φ. The (path) formula <>φ means that φ holds
eventually in some state of a path. The variable s.rt models
the routing table of node s, and the field s.rt[d].nhop
represents the next hop for destination d. If the value of this
field is zero, it means that the routing table entry is empty,
or—in terms of the AODV specification [9]—non-existent.
UPPAAL was able to refute this property, showing that there
is indeed a run where node s is not able to establish a route to
node d at all. The message sequence chart in Fig. 2 returned by
UPPAAL illustrates why this is the case. It shows the activities
and messages sent by the three nodes and the tester.
The scenario begins with two packets both destined for
node d, injected by automaton tester at nodes s and a (Steps
0 and 1 in Fig. 2). Once this has occurred, nodes s and d
begin their route discovery process. In this event trace, node a
first broadcasts a route request (Step 2), which is received
by nodes s and d; these received messages are placed in the
buffers of nodes s and d. The message sequence chart only
displays the name of the channels that were used, in this case
the broadcast channel rreq[a]. UPPAAL also reports the values
of the variables at each node, but it does not include these
information in the chart.
Next, node s broadcasts its own route request for d, but only
a is in range (Step 3). In the next three events node d responds
to a’s route request with a route reply message (Step 4), then
node a re-broadcasts s’s route request (Step 5), followed by
node d responding to node s’s route request with a route reply
(Step 7). At this point, AODV (the process running on node a)
should forward that reply back to s; however, the remaining
events (Steps 8 to 13) show that this does not happen.
The problem is that although the request for a route to
node d is properly relayed to the destination d, the reply from
d to s’s route request is ignored by node a. This means that
the originator of the second request, node s, never receives the
reply. The discarding of the RREP message happens according
to the RFC specification of AODV [9]. It states that an
intermediate node only forwards the RREP message if it is
not the originator node and it has created or updated a route
entry to the destination node described in the RREP message.
“If the current node is not the node indicated by the Orig-
inator IP Address in the RREP message AND a forward
route has been created or updated as described above,
the node consults its route table entry for the originating
node to determine the next hop for the RREP packet, and
then forwards the RREP towards the originator using the
information in that route table entry.”
[RFC3561, page 21]
Looking at the sequence chart we see that node a has
received a reply to its own request from node d (Step 4) and
therefore node a has already established a route to d when
the second reply is received in Step 7. Due to this existing
routing table entry, and the fact that the second reply message
does not contain any new information about the destination
node d (from the point of view of node a), the routing table
entry in node a is not updated and therefore the reply is not
forwarded. This can be seen by inspection of the state variables
in the UPPAAL model.
A possible solution that would solve this shortcoming would
be to forward every reply received by a node. Obviously,
this would increase the number of control messages gener-
ated during route discovery. On the other hand, the AODV
specification recovers from this problem by implementing a
time-out. If the originator node s does not receive a RREP
within a given time, it initiates another route discovery. The
correctness and the efficiency of these two solutions can be
compared via simulations. So far, we know that the time-out
solution does not solve the problem entirely. A repeated route
request does not guarantee the receipt of a route reply and the
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property A<> s.rt[d].nhop!=0 still does not hold. It is
easy to construct an example; instead of a linear topology with
3 nodes, we use a linear topology with n+2 nodes, where n
is the maximum number of repeated route requests [4].
B. AODV can produce non-optimal routes
In AODV’s route discovery process, a RREQ message is
broadcast from a source node s, in search of a route to the
destination node d. Intermediate nodes that receive the RREQ
message create routing table entries for the source node s.
In addition, they will re-broadcast and forward the RREQ
message. The destination node d (or an intermediate node that
has a valid route to node d) will respond with a RREP message
and discard the received RREQ message. Duplicate RREQ
messages received later (via other routes) are also discarded.
The act of discarding RREQ messages at the destination node
can inadvertently cause other intermediate nodes to create non-
optimal routes to the source node s [7]. Here, we define route
optimality in terms of a least-cost metric, i.e., hop count.
In this experiment we confirm that the termination of the
route discovery process at the destination node can lead to
other nodes inadvertently creating non-optimal routes to the
source node, and that AODV does not always find the best
possible routes within the network.
b
s a
c
d
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R
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RREQ
Fig. 3. Non-optimal route selection - I
We illustrate this phenomenon with the example found by
UPPAAL, with the topology shown in Fig. 3. In this example
a new data packet from node s to node d is injected. Since
node s has initially no route to node d, it will initiate the route
discovery process. If the AODV protocol would guarantee an
optimal route with respect to hop count, the model should
satisfy the following: “Node s will always find a route to node
d with hop count two”, which can be expressed in UPPAAL
as
A<> s.rt[d].hops==2
As shown in Fig 3, the RREQ messages are forwarded along
two paths; via node a and via node b. However, due to some
circumstances, node a cannot forward the RREQ message im-
mediately. Such situations can occur in real network scenarios
due to a number of reasons, such as contention. In this scenario
the RREQ message travelling along the path s–b–c–d reaches
d first. Node d then replies by unicasting a RREP message
back to node s, via nodes c and b. Only then node a forwards
the RREQ message received from node s. Node d discards the
RREQ message received from node a, since the route request
has been handled before. Hence, node s will establish a non-
optimal route (of hop count three) to node d, via nodes b
and c.
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Fig. 4. Non-optimal route selection - II
Another example of a non-optimal route that does not
involve the timing of RREQ messages was found for the
topology shown in Fig. 4. In this example two new data
packets are injected, first a packet from node s to node d,
and later a packet from node a to s. If the AODV protocol
would guarantee an optimal route with respect to hop count,
node a should eventually find a route of hop count two to s.
The model should guarantee the following:
A<> a.rt[s].hops==2
As before, UPPAAL finds a counter-example. First, node s
generates and broadcasts a RREQ message for destination d,
that is received by its neighbour nodes b and d. Since node
d is the destination, it responds to the RREQ message by
unicasting a RREP message back to s, before discarding the
RREQ message. Meanwhile, node b re-broadcasts the RREQ
message to its neighbours c and s. Node c then behaves
similarly and forwards the message to a and b. Node a thus
establishes a route of hop count three to node s (via c and b),
before forwarding the RREQ message to d. However, node d
will drop the RREQ message because it has already received
the message previously. If a now has to send a data packet
to s, it will use the route via c and b, rather than the shorter
route (of hop count two) via d. A possible solution to solve
this problem is to allow the destination node d to continue to
forward the first RREQ message that it received (as proposed
in [4]). By doing so, node a will be able to discover its
optimal route (of hop count two) to node s, via node d.
This proposed solution might have the drawback of increased
control message overhead. However, we do expect the same
amount of messages in average—a detailed investigation is
part of future work.
The size of the generated UPPAAL models is manageable.
The largest of the three models presented in this paper is
the last one, with 5 nodes and two injected messages. It has
19833 reachable states. Finding a counterexample to the above
specification takes less than 0.1 seconds on an Intel Core i5
2.5 GHz PC.
V. RELATED WORK
Other researchers have used formal specification and ana-
lysis techniques to investigate the correctness and performance
of AODV; we survey the sample related to model checking.
Bhargavan et al. [2] were amongst the first to use model
checking on a preliminary draft of AODV, demonstrating
the feasibility and value of automated verification of routing
protocols. Their investigations using the SPIN model checker
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revealed that in some circumstances routes containing loops
can be created. Their suggested variation which does guarantee
loop freedom were not included in the current standard.
Musuvathi et al. [8] introduced the CMC model checker
primarily to search for coding errors in implementations of
protocols written in C. They use AODV as an example and,
as well as discovering a number of errors, they also found
a problem with the specification itself which has since been
corrected.
Chiyangwa and Kwiatkowska [3] use the timing features
of UPPAAL to study the relationship between the timing
parameters and the performance of route finding. They were
able to establish a dependence between the lifetime of a
route and the size of the network, although their study only
considered a single source and single destination, and a simple
static linear topology. Our counter-example of Section IV-A
confirms some of the problems that they discovered, and show
that they hold even in an untimed model.
Other researchers have used model checking to analyse
other routing protocols. Wibling et al. [11] used SPIN and
UPPAAL to verify aspects of the LUNAR protocol, which is
also used in ad hoc routing for wireless networks. In particular
the timing feature of UPPAAL was used to check upper and
lower bounds on route finding and packet delivery times. The
scenarios considered included a limited number of topology
changes where problems were suspected.
De Renesse and Aghvami [10] used SPIN to study the
WARP protocol. To reduce the overhead on model checking,
various simplifications were imposed on a five-node network,
including a single source and destination and limitations on
the degree that the network can change.
Our approach is in line with these related works. However,
it is unique in the sense that our UPPAAL model complements
our process algebra specification of AODV. As mentioned be-
fore, we believe that these two approaches to formal protocol
modelling, specification and evaluation, if used together, can
provide a powerful tool for the development and rigorous
evaluation of new protocols and variations, and improvements
of existing ones. Currently, our UPPAAL model is derived by
hand directly from the AWN process algebra specification, but
an automatic translation from AWN in the style of Musuvathi
et al. [8] would be possible, and remains as future work.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK
The aim of our ongoing work is to complement by model
checking a process algebraic description of WMN routing pro-
tocols in general, and AODV in particular. The used descrip-
tion of AODV described in [4] is amongst the first detailed
formal models of AODV. Having the ability of model checking
formal specifications will allow the confirmation and de-
tailed diagnostics of suspected errors which arise during mod-
elling. The availability of an executable model will become
especially useful in the evaluation of proposed improvements
to AODV, something which we have already started to do [4].
For example, we have sketched a possible solution for the
problem presented in Section IV-A, which of course should
also be evaluated by formal and rigorous analysis by means
of process algebra and model checking. We are currently
setting up an environment where we can test a whole bunch
of different topologies in a systematic manner. Moreover, we
are compiling a library of problem scenarios in AODV. By
using the executable model, this will allow us to do a fast
comparison between standard AODV and proposed variations
in contexts known to be problematic. Moreover an executable
model will be able to considerably increase the number and
variety of scenarios which we can explore.
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